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Statutory Construction: 
Maryland State Police Ordered To 
Obey Agency's Own Regulation 
In Zeigler v. Maryland St4te Police, I the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, ap-
plying principles of statutory construc-
tion, ordered the Maryland State Police to 
follow the agency's own regulation regard-
ing the appointment of disciplinary hear-
ing boards. At the same time, Judge 
Edward A. DeW aters, Jr., resolved an issue 
of jurisdiction in favor of the plaintiff, re-
solved issues of severance and attorney's 
fees in favor of the defendant, and provid-
ed some guidance on a constitutional issue 
based on due process. 
FACTS 
The plaintiff, First Sergeant John M. 
Zeigler, assigned to the Maryland State 
Police Academy, was administratively 
charged with knowingly submitting a false 
report,2 endorsing an incomplete report,3 
interfering with cases assigned to other of-
ficers,· and neglecting duty by failing to 
take appropriate action.5 All charges were 
based on allegedly concealing information 
relating to a sexual relationship between 
another member of the academy staff and 
a recruit. The State Police also charged a 
captain with three violations and a first 
lieutenant with two violations. 
The permanent chair of the disciplinary 
hearing board issued Special Order 01-87-
260, which provided, in pertinent part, the 
following: 
This board consists of five members 
who will hear the entire case against all 
three defendants and participate in the 
By Professor Byron L. Warnken 
decision making process pertaining to 
motions, evidence, etc. However, the 
decision on verdict and penalty on 
each defendant will be decided on 
upon [sic] by Major ["A"], Captain 
["B"] and the member of the board 
equal in rank to the defendant being 
considered at the time, i.e., Major 
["A"], Captain ["B"] and Captain 
["C1"] will decide the verdict and 
penalty in the case of [accused captain 
"X"]; Major ["A"], Captain ["B"] and 
First Lieutenant ["C-2"] will decide 
the verdict and penalty in the case of 
[accused lieutenant "Y"]; and Major 
["A"], Captain ["B"] and First Ser-
geant ["C-3"] will decide the penalty 
and verdict in the case of First Sergeant 
Zeigler. 
Zeigler filed a motion to have the three 
cases tried separately, each before a sepa-
rate three-member hearing board. The mo-
tion was denied by the chair of the 
five-member hearing board. Zeigler then 
filed, pursuant to the Law Enforcement 
Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR),6 an ap-
plication for a show cause order7 in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County. An 
accompanying memorandum of law made 
two arguments, one statutory and one con-
stitutional. 
The essence of the statutory construc-
tion argument was as follows: The 
Superintendent of the Maryland State 
Police, pursuant to a delegation of authori-
ty from the legislature, promulgated an ad-
ministrative regulation mandating that the 
permanent hearing board chair shall ap-
point a three-member hearing board. The 
only discretion provided by the regulation 
is whether the permanent chair will serve 
on a given board. Nonetheless, the perma-
nent chair appointed a five-member hear-
ing board in this case. The failure of the 
State Police to comply with its own man-
datory regulation renders invalid any ac-
tion taken by the improperly constituted 
board. 
The essense of the constitutional argu-
ment was as follows: Administrative agen-
cy due process is determined by balancing 
(1) the private interest affected by official 
action, (2) the risk of depriving that in-
terest through the procedures used and the 
availability of remedial procedures, and (3) 
the public burden in affording the private 
remedy. In this case, the procedure would 
make a fair hearing almost impossible. All 
five members of the hearing board, simul-
taneously hearing three separate cases, 
would collectively make all legal rulings in 
the three cases. Then, three three-member 
sub-boards, with two members common 
to all su'b-boards, would resolve the issue 
of guilt, and, in the event of a guilty find-
ing, recommend punishment. Every finder 
of fact sub-board would be tainted by (1) 
two original participants then removed, (2) 
two finders of fact simultaneously serving 
on two other boards, (3) one finder of fact 
not serving on two other boards but who 
has heard the two other cases for which he 
was not on the board, and (4) two finders 
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of fact in the second and third cases influ-
enced by knowledge of their verdicts in 
whichever case was previously decided. 
The readily available remedy, with virtual-
ly no burden on the State Police, would be 
to appoint a separate three-member hear-
ing board for each of three separate hear-
ings. 
JURISDICTION 
The State Police argued that the circuit 
court lacked jurisdiction because Zeigler 
(1) failed to exhaust administrative reme-
dies, and (2) failed to allege a violation of 
the LEOBOR. Zeigler responded by argu- . 
ing that the circuit court obtained jurisdic-
tion under the "show cause" provision of 
the LEOBOR, which provides: 
Any law enforcement officer who is 
denied any right afforded by this subti-
tle may apply at any time prior to the 
commencement of the hearing before 
the hearing board, ... to the circuit 
court of the county V?here he is regu-
larly employed for an order direaing 
the law enforcement agency to show 
cause why the right should not be 
afforded.8 
Section 734B provides that "this subtitle 
shall supersede any State, county or muni-
cipal law, ordinance, or regulation that 
conflicts with [its] provisions ... "9 The 
court of special appeals recognized the leg-
islature's intent in Prince George's County 
v. State Commission on Human Relations, 10 
and stated that the legislature, in order "to 
be certain that all conflicts among prior 
statutes and the [LEOBOR] could be readi-
ly resolved, ... established the superiority 
of the [LEOBOR] in section 734B .... "11 
In Chief, Baltimore County Police Depart· 
ment v. Marchsteiner,12 the court addressed 
the same issue raised by the first conten-
tion of the State Police. The court found 
that the rights in the LEOBOR are en-
forced through section 734 and that the 
statute "contains no hint of any necessity 
of exhausting administrative or grievance 
procedures as a precondition to access to 
the COUrts."13 The court of special appeals 
held that "a legislative purpose in enacting 
the LEOB[O]R was to provide an exclu-
sive and self-contained procedure in the 
circuit court for assertion of a denial of the 
administrative procedure rights embodied 
. • "14 mit. 
The defendant's alternative theory was 
that even if the court had jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff had not alleged an LEOBOR vi~ 
lation for the court to remedy. Zeigler 
argued that if jurisdiction were dependent 
upon an enumerated LEOBOR provision, 
the court could look to section 727(d) (1) 
(the hearing board definition section),15 
section 730 (the administrative hearing sec-
tion),16 and section 733 (the incorporation 
of constitutional rights section)P The stat-
utory construction approach of Zeigler's 
claim was based on a violation of a manda-
tory State Police regulation, which was 
promulgated to implement sections 727(d) 
(1) and 730.18 Enabling statutes and their 
implementing regulations are in pari 
materia and the regulations become an 
extension of the statute.19 He argued that 
to find a failure to assert an LEOBOR vi~ 
lation would require a hypertechnical 
reading of his application and supporting 
memorandum. 
However, even assuming no allegation 
of an enumerated LEOBOR violation, 
Zeigler argued that the defendant's posi-
tion was fatally flawed by the recent case 
of Cochran v. Anderson.20 In that case, the 
Maryland-National Capitol Park and Plan-
ning Commission adopted regulations 
governing proceedings under the 
LEOBOR.21 The circuit court ordered a 
termination of all LEOBOR proceedings 




and regulations . .. " 
its own regulations. The Commission 
appealed, alleging a lack of jurisdiction 
because section 734 does not authorize the 
circuit court to terminate an LEOBOR 
proceeding. In rejecting this argument, the 
court of special appeals found that section 
734 was designed to enable the circuit 
court to provide broad judicial equitable 
relief. "It is a very special provision, allow-
ing resort to the court 'prior to the com-
mencement of the hearing before the 
hearing board.' The purpose of that provi-
sion obviously is ... to assure that the 
police agency will do what the law 
requires."22 The court held that the circuit 
court has wide-ranging authority under 
section 734 to fashion an appropriate 
remedy, even to the point of terminating 
a LEOBOR hearing, and such remedy 
may be invoked in response to the agen-
cy's violation of its own rules. 
Judge DeWaters ruled that the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County had jurisdic-
tion in Zeigler v. Maryland State Police. 
STATUrORY CONSTRUCTION 
The LEOBOR provides that a discipli-
nary hearing "shall be conducted by a 
hearing board."2J However, the legislature 
did not set forth in the "hearing" seaion 
(seaion 730) any size or composition 
requirements for hearing boards other 
than the implicit incorporation of the 
definitional· section. The definitional sec-
tion (section 727 (d) (1» defers the hearing 
board decision to the administrative agen-
cy, subject to a minimum size requirement 
of three and a composition requirement of 
at least one member of equal rank to the 
accused.24 The legislature has otherwise 
delegated the hearing board size and com-
position decision to the Superintendent of 
State Police.25 
Pursuant to this delegation, the Superin-
tendent promulgated the administrative 
rules and regulations contained in the 
Maryland State Police Administrative 
Manual. Chapter 5, section V, subsection 
3-2b provides in pertinent part as follows: 
The permanent chairman of the hear-
ing board shall, with the Superintend-
ent's authority, appoint ... a three-
man[26] board which shall consist of at 
least one commissioned officer and 
one member of a rank equal to that of 
the accused. The permanent chairman, 
in his discretion, may serve as a sitting 
member of any such board and in 
those cases when he chooses not to sit, 
one of the appointed commissioned 
officers shall be designated as the board 
chairman .... 27 
Thus, under subsection 3-2b, as to hearing 
board size and composition, "[t]he perma-
nent chairman of the hearing board shall 
... appoint ... a three-man board which 
shall consist of at least one commissioned 
officer and one member of a rank equal to 
that of the accused."28 
Administrative regulations have the 
same force of law as the enabling legisla-
tion authorizing the agency to prom-
ulgate.29 As the federal district court for 
Maryland stated, "once an administrative 
agency has promulgated a regulation, even 
in instances where it is not required to do 
so, that administrative agency is bound to 
follow its regulation. This is particularly 
true where the regulation uses unambig-
uous, mandatory language."JO Quoting the 
Supreme Court's decision in United St4tes 
ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, J 1 the court of 
special appeals stated, in Williams v. 
j,[cHugh,J2 that "'[a]n agency of the 
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government must scrupulously observe 
rules, regulations, or procedures which it 
has established. When it fails to do so, its 
action cannot stand and courts will strike 
it down.' "33 In Vitarelli t'J. Senton, 34 the Su-
preme Court struck down the adverse per-
sonnel action of a federal agency because it 
failed to follow its own regulation. Justice 
Harlan held that "the Secretary ... was 
bound by the regulations which he himself 
had promulgated for dealing with such 
cases, even though without such regulation 
he could have discharged petitioner sum-
marily."35 
In interpreting administrative regula-
tions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
employs the same principles of construc-
tion that are used to determine the mean-
ing of statutes.36 "Whenever the word 
'shall' is used it is mandatory. Why else 
would this word be Used?"37 The term 
"shall" establishes an imperative obliga-
tion upon the agency and forecloses its ex-
ercise of discretion.38 Such a regulation 
creates a mandatory limitation on the 
agency, prohibiting action to the con-
trary.39 This is so even when the reviewing 
court believes that the mandatory language 
is unwise or its impact is harsh.40 
Assuming arguendo that the State Police 
could convince the court that subsection 3-
2b's double use of the term "shall" in the 
first sentence does not automatically make 
the regulation mandatory, any doubt must 
be eliminated by the subsection's striking 
change of expression from "shall" to 
"may."41 Although the first sentence of 
subsection 3-2b provides that the perma-
nent chair "shall" appoint a three-member 
board and "shall" have at least one com-
missioned officer and one member of the 
defendant's rank, the second sentence pro-
vides as follows: "The permanent chair-
man, in his discretion, may serve as a sitting 
member of any such board and in those 
cases when he chooses not to sit, one of the 
appointed commissioned officers shall be 
designated as the board chairman."42 The 
leading treatise on starutory construction 
includes the following: 
Where both mandatory and direc-
tory verbs are used in the same starute, 
or in the same section, paragraph, or 
sentence of a statute, it is a fair 
inference that the legislature realized 
the difference in meaning, and intend-
ed that the verbs used should carry 
with them their ordinary meanings. 
This is especially true where «shall" and 
«may" are used in close juxtaposition 
under circumstances that would in-
dicate that a different treatment is in-
tended for the predicates following 
them.43 
Not only are "shall" and "may" juxta-
posed in subsection 3-2b, the only time 
that "may" is used, it is accompanied by 
the words "in his discretion," whereas 
whenever "shall" is used, the accompany-
ing extension of discretion is conspicuous 
by its absence. A maxim of statutory con-
struction is expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, meaning that the expression of 
one thing is the exclusion of others. This 
maxim is most applicable when the drafter 
included in one place that which was omit-
ted in another, on the theory that if the 
drafter wished to include, the drafter 
would have done so, and the failure to in-
clude, particularly after inclusion in the 
same section, will never be deemed in-
advertent.44 
Once determined to be a mandatory reg-
ulation, any doubt that the mandate is for 
a board of three members - not more and 
not less - must be resolved by again apply-
ing the principle of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius. Subsection 3-2b's manda-
"A maxim of 
statutory construction 
is expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" 
tory requirements for board size and com-
position are as follows: "The permanent 
chairman of the hearing board shall. .. ap-
point ... a three-man board that shall con-
sist of at least one commissioned officer 
and one member of a rank equal to that of 
the accused."45 When the Superintendent 
intended to give the permanent chair the 
option to select a given number or more 
than that number, he provided "at least 
X." However, when he intended only 
"X," the phrase "at least" is conspicuous 
by its absence. Thus, the size of the hear-
ing board shall be three.46 
Zeigler argued that resolving the inter-
pretation of subsection 3-2b could not be 
more straightforward. The first sentence 
places a mandate upon the permanent 
hearing board chair to appoint a three-
member hearing board. The language is 
plain on its face. The result is the same, 
whether reached by examining the manda-
tory language of the first sentence standing 
alone or by examining the first sentence by 
way of contrast to the permissive language 
in the second sentence. 
The State Police countered with its own 
statutory construction argument. Chapter 
5, section V, subsection 3-0 of the 
Maryland State Police Administrative 
Manual provides as follows: 
The rules and regulations in this sub-
section define policy for the imposi-
tion of discipline within the Agency. 
These rules and regulations are guides 
for handling disciplinary actions and 
generally should be followed. In un-
usual situations not covered by these 
rules and regulations, or where strict 
adherence to these rules would work 
an injustice, deviations from the rules 
and regulations are permitted. 
The hearing board chairman and the 
other members of the board should be 
flexible and should not apply these 
rules, regulations and rules of evidence 
mechanically Y 
The State Police argued that subsection 
3-0 demonstrated the Superintendent's in-
tent to make subsection 3-2b merely direc-
tory. "These rules and regulations are 
guides . .. The hearing board ... should be 
flexible and should not apply these rules 
mechanically."48 Moreover, the regulation 
specifically provides for "deviations" 
when encountering "situations not 
covered by these rules" or when the rules 
"would work an injustice."49 The State 
Police took the position that this case fell 
within both exceptions: (1) it was a com-
plex case with three defendants and thus a 
situation not covered by the rules; (2) with 
three co-defendants allegedly acting in con-
cert, the permanent chair could have con-
cluded that the interests of justice would 
be best served by a combined trial heard 
by five members. 
Zeigler argued that his case did not come 
within either exception. First, the rules ex-
pressly cover every case on the issue of 
board size, i.e., "shall. .. appoint ... a 
three-man board .... "50 Second, the ex-
ception to avoid injustice could only have 
been intended to inure solely to the benefit 
of the officer, not the agency. Judge 
DeWaters ruled that subsection 3-2b man-
dated a three-member board and that noth-
ing in subsection 3-0 undermined that 
mandate in this case. 
DUE PROCESS OF lAW 
Having resolved the case on statutory 
construction grounds, the court had no 
need to rule on the constitutional issue. 
Nonetheless, the court addressed due pro-
cess briefly. 
Zeigler had requested the court to order 
three three-person boards. Although the 
court ordered a three-person board, it 
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refused to sever the case into three separate 
boards. Judge DeWaters noted that noth-
ing in either the LEOBOR or the 
Maryland State Police Administrative 
Manual controls the situation. He stated 
that this could best be ruled on by the 
hearing board, using the same considera-
tions that a court uses in granting or deny-
ing severance to criminal defendants. 
However, he recognized the strength of 
the due process argument and stated: "I 
think. the Board has to be extremely care-
ful in making [the severance] decision ... , 
because if there is any kind of conflict, 
anything that will work any injustice 
resulting of him being tried with one or 
two of the others, then it's going to get 
here on appeal[51] and be sent back for an 
independent hearing because of that con-
flict ... "52 
In Mathews 'tI. Eldridge,53 the Supreme 
Court enunciated a three-part balancing 
test for ascertaining whether an adminis-
trative agency has satisfied the require-
ments of due process. The Court stated: 
First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the prepara-
tion involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural require-
ments would entail.S4 
This test involves balancing costs and ben-
efits to determine what kind of hearing 
due process requires.55 The greater the 
potential harm, the heavier the burden on 
the administrative agency to provide a pro-
cedurally fairer hearing. Similarly, the 
smaller the burden on the agency, the less 
need for potential harm before requiring 
the agency to accommodate. 
Zeigler argued that the special order 
established a hearing procedure that (1) 
had a high degree of risk of unfairness in 
the fact finding process, (2) had an 
appearance of unfairness in the fact finding 
process, and (3) violated the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).56 Moreover, 
he argued that the administrative burden 
imposed on the State Police to eliminate 
these three problems and provide due pro-
cess was de minimus. An examination of 
each of the three parts of the Supreme 
Court's test resulted in the following: 
(1) The private interest affected by 
the official action. 
A non-probationary public employee 
has a constitutionally protected property 
interest requiring due process of law. 57 The 
Supreme Court stated that police officers 
"are not relegated to a watered-down ver-
sion of constitutional rights .... "58 In 
Nichols 'tI. Baltimore Police Department, 59 
the court of special appeals described the 
legislative intent of the LEOBOR as fol-
lows: "The purpose of the LEOBOR is to 
guarantee to those law-enforcement offi-
cers embraced therein procedural safe-
guards during investigation and hearing of 
matters concerned with disciplinary action 
against the officer.... In enacting the 
LEOBOR, the Legislature vested in law-
enforcement officers certain 'rights' not 
available to the general public."60 
(2) The risk of deprivation through 
the procedures used and the proba-
ble value of additional or substitute 
procedureal safeguards. 
The special order established a five-
member hearing board to hear simultane-
ously three separate cases, involving dif-
ferent charges, against three different 
defendants. Moreover, the order provided 
for three separate, yet greatly overlapping, 
trier of fact panels to simultaneously hear 
three cases. Multiple triers of fact for 
simultaneously tried defendants is highly 
disfavored. 
In Scarborough 'tI. State,61 two defendants 
were tried jointly, with a separate jury 
empaneled to hear each case. Although 
finding no reversible error in that case, 
UThe purpose of the 
LEOBOR is to 
guarantee . .. proce-
dural safeguards . .. " 
nevertheless, the court stated that such a 
procedure has too many risks of prejudice 
to a fair trial, concluding that "we join the 
other courts in strongly condemning the 
use of dual juries."62 This condemnation 
has been implicitly extended to any jointly 
tried defendants having different triers of 
fact. In Nair 'tI. State,63 the court of special 
appeals relied upon Scarborough to 
"strongly disapprove of the practice of 
conducting joint and simultaneous trials of 
co-defendants" when one has the court as 
trier of fact and one has a jury.64 
Zeigler argued that his case presented a 
procedure considerably worse than that in 
Scarborough in two ways. First, in his case, 
the triers of fact also would be the triers of 
law, i.e., the court. By the very nature of 
the process, the five board members would 
commingle their thoughts about the case 
as it progressed. The special order provid-
ed that the "five members ... will hear the 
entire case against all three defendants and 
participate in the decision making process 
pertaining to motions, evidence, etc." 
Second, not only were the board 
members intended to commingle their 
thoughts while serving as the triers of law, 
they were intended to commingle their 
thoughts while serving as triers of fact. In 
Scarborough, no finder of fact ever delib-
erated on the merits of the case with a 
finder of fact from the other panel. In 
Zeigler's case, on the other hand, every 
finder of fact would always deliberate with 
a finder of fact who served on another 
defendant's panel. Moreover, in this case, 
the prosecution was asserting that there 
was one cover-up with complicity among 
three officers. Consequently, there would 
be a subtle, yet strong, pressure to render 
consistent verdicts. Upon deliberation on 
the cases of whichever officers were 
resolved second and third, two of the three 
members of the board would deliberate 
knowing the verdict in the preceding cases, 
having just rendered them. 
Both the "judge of law versus judge of 
fact" problem and the "judge of fact in 
multiple cases" problem would be exacer-
bated in Zeigler's case by the fact that the 
members of the board would be lay per-
sonnel. Although a judge can be expected 
to fulfill these roles simultaneously, differ-
entiating and excluding mentally, as neces-
sary, a non-judge cannot be expected to 
accomplish this task. In short, the hearing 
board procedure made a fair hearing 
unrealistic, if not almost impossible.6S 
It is true that Scarborough was a criminal 
case and that Zeigler is an administrative 
adjudicatory hearing. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that 
because an administrative agency does not 
follow rules as strict as the judiciary, the 
need to measure the adjudicatory proceed-
ings against the requirements of due pro-
cess is even greater. In Ohio Bell Telephone 
Co. 'tI. Public Utilities Commission, 66 Justice 
Cardoza stated: 
Regulatory commissions have been 
invested with broad police powers 
within the sphere of duty assigned to 
them by law. Even in quasi-judicial 
proceedings their informed and expert 
judgment exacts and receives a proper 
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deference from courts when it has been 
reached with due submission to constitu-
tional restraints. Indeed, much that they 
do within the realm of administrative dis-
cretion is exempt from supervision if those 
restraints have been obeyed. All the more 
insistent is the need, when power has been 
bestowed so freely, that the "inexorable 
safeguard" of a fair and open hearing be 
maintained in its integrity. The right to 
such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of 
fair play" assured to every litigant by the 
fourteenth amendment as a minimal re-
quirement. There can be no compromise 
on the footing of convenience or expedien-
cy or because of a natural desire to be rid 
of harassing delay, when that minimal re-
quirement has been neglected or ignored.67 
The Court has also stated that whenever 
the administrative agency's action is ad-
judicatory, "it is imperative [to] use the 
procedures which have been associated 
with the judicial process."68 
Due process is not only concerned with 
the risk of unfairness but also the appear-
ance of unfairness. In Marshall v. ferrieo, 
Inc.,69 the Supreme Court stated that the 
"Due Process Clause ... helps to guarantee 
that life, liberty, or property will not be 
taken on the basis of erroneous or dis-
torted conception of the facts or the law. 
At the same time, it preserves both the ap-
pearance and reality of fairness ... "70 In 
Fleck v. King County/I the Court of Ap-
peals of Washington, in applying the "ap-
pearance of fairness doctrine," stated the 
following: 
The administrative tribunals which 
perform judicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions must be as above suspicion and 
reproach as courts themselves. When 
the circumstances are such that the 
conduct of one member of a tribunal 
may have infected the independent de-
cision making process of others on the 
tribunal, the potential exists for the 
weakening of public confidence in the 
operation of the agency, and actions 
taken by boards, commissions, tribu-
nals or agencies under such a cloud 
must disappear .... A petitioner or liti-
gant is entitled to a decision arrived at 
by the separate members of the body 
uncommitteed, unallied, and unfet-
tered at the commencement of their 
deliberations.71 
Zeigler argued that the risks that were 
soundly denounced in Scarborough were so 
greatly multiplied in his case as to un-
constitutionally deprive him of due pro-
cess of law, particularly when examining 
the value of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards. The appointment of a 
separate three-member hearing board for 
each of three separate hearings would re-
solve the constitutional defect. 
Additionally, the fact finding process es-
tablished by the special order violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).73 
To the extent that the APA does not con-
flict with the LEOBOR/4 it controls 
police department disciplinary hearing 
boards.75 Section 10-207(b) provides that 
when hearing a contested case, "[t]he hear-
ing officer shalL' (1) conduct the hearing; 
and (2) submit in writing to the agency, of-
ficial, or employee who delegated the 
authority: (i) proposed findings of fact; and 
(ii) proposed conclusions of law."76 This 
section requires a hearing officer to per-
form both the function of conducting the 
"Due process 
is. . . concerned with 
the risk [and] 
appearance of 
,I'. • " un) atrness . .. 
hearing and that of deciding (or recom-
mending decision on) the merits. In 
Zeigler's case, the special order assigned 
five members to conduct the hearing 
under subsection (b) (1) but only three 
members to render a decision on the 
merits under subsection (b) (2). Any proce-
dure in which one number of hearing offi-
cers conducts the hearing and a different 
number decides the merits of the case can 
easily distort the "majority rule" decision 
making process.77 
Moreover, section 10-213(a) (1) of the 
APA provides that "an individual who is 
not authorized to participate in the de-
cision making process of a contested case 
may not communicate ex parte with an in-
dividual who is involved in the process 
with regard to any issue of law or fact in 
the contested case."78 In this case, two of 
the five hearing board members were "not 
authorized to participate in the decision 
making process" as to the merits of each of 
the three cases, yet these two members 
were instructed by the special order to 
"communicate ex parte with [the three in-
individuals who were] involved in the pro-
cess with regard to [motions, evidence, 
etc.]." This violation would invalidate the 
proceeding,79 
(3) The fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute 
procedureal requirements would en-
tail for the governmental agency. 
The administrative burden in constitut-
ing three separate three-member hearing-
boards is de minimus, both in the abstract 
and when weighed against the harm in the 
Zeigler case. The court in Scarborough rec-
ognized that the potential problems caused 
by a multiple fact finder scenario greatly 
outweigh any administrative ease that such 
a procedure may afford. The court stated 
that "appropriate safeguards necessary to 
protect the rights of defendants in such a 
trial would be more time consuming than 
if separate trials were ordered."80 In H;Yt 
v. Police Commissioner,81 the Baltimore Ci-
ty Police Department, following the 1974 
police strike that involved 901 officers, 
conducted disciplinary hearings against 
130 officers. A separate hearing board was 
constituted for each officer. Certainly, the 
formation of two additional three-member 
hearing boards would be a small adminis-
trative price to pay to ensure due process 
of law. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In Gardner v. Broderick,82 the Supreme 
Court prohibited placing a chilling effect 
on the constitutional rights of law enforce-
ment officers. Section 733 of the 
LEOBOR prohibits creating a chilling ef-
fect on LEOBOR rights.83 
Zeigler asked the court to award reasona-
ble attorney's fees, arguing that without 
such an award there was an economic chill-
ing effect upon his ability to even seek that 
to which he was entitled. He noted that 
the judicial relief sought in this case under 
the show cause provision was requested ad-
ministratively in writing seven months 
earlier. Law enforcement agencies are 
represented by government-employed at-
torneys. Consequently, the cost of litiga-
tion receives relatively little consideration 
by the agency. Zeigler argued that even if 
he prevailed on the merits, he would still 
be penalized an amount equal to the cost 
of attorney's fees. Only by an award of at-
torney's fees could the court place him in 
the position of being afforded his rights 
without being penalized for their asser-
tion. 
In Cochran v. Anderson,84 the court of 
special appeals stated that "[t]he purpose 
of [section 734] obviously is ... to assure 
that the police agency will do what the law 
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requires."85 Anderson vested in the circuit 
courts broad judicial equitable relief. 
Zeigler urged the court to fashion its 
remedy broadly enough so that he would 
not receive severe economic punishment, 
imposed indirectly by the State Police by 
forcing him to litigate to make the agency 
obey its own rules. Moreover, such a 
remedy may have the effect of making the 
agency think. twice before similarly deny-
ing a constitutional, statutory, or regulato-
ry benefit to one of its officers. 
Judge DeWaters denied attorney's fees, 
stating that "the situation is sufficiendy 
complicated and has sufficient merit on 
each side that it does not warrant the 
Court to award attorney's fees."86 
CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement officers play a vital 
role in society. Their responsibilities are 
great and their compensation is small. The 
problems of law enforcement should not 
be exacerbated by an adversarial rdation-
ship between law enforcement agencies 
and law enforcement officers. Agencies 
have consistendy denied constitutional, 
statutory, and regulatory protection to 
their own officers. As a last resort, officers 
are litigating to obtain their rights. Court 
decisions, such as Zeigler 1:1. Maryland State 
Police, ordering law enforcement agencies 
to respect the rights of their officers, may 
produce the necessary balance between 
agency and officer that will enable them to 
concentrate less on each other and more 
on their vital mission. 
Notes 
1 No. 87-CG5089 49/159 (Cir. Ct. Balto. County, 
Md., Mar. 16, 1988). 
2 Md. State Police Admin. Manual ch. 5, S 1-15-4 
(2d ed. 1977 tit Supp. 1984). 
3 IJ. 5 1·15-5. 
4 IJ. 5 1-19-2. 
5 IJ. S 1·28.J. 
6 Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 727, 1974 Md. Laws 
2471-77 (codified as amended at Md. Ann. Code 
art. 27, S5 727-734D (1987). 
7 Md. Ann. Code art. 27, 5 734. 
I IJ. 
9IJ. S 734B. 
10 40 Md. App. 473, 392 A.2d 105 (1978), (1ac. on 
otbagrounds, 285 Md. 205, 401 A.2d 661 (1979). 
II IJ. at 486, 392 A.2d at 113-14. 
12 55 Md. App. 108, 461 A.2d 28 (1983). 
13 IJ. at 115, 461 A.2d at 32. 
14 IJ. at 116, 461 A.2d at 32. 
15 See infra text accompanying note 24. 
16 IJ. 
17 See infra notes 51-81 and accompanying text. 
II See infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
20 73 Md. App. 604, 535 A.2d 955 (1988). 
21 IJ. at 613, 535 A.2d at 956-57. 
22 IJ. at 613, 535 A.2d at 959 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
23 Md. Ann. Code art. 27, S 73O(d). 
24 IJ. S 727( dX 1). 
25 See iJ. art. 88B, S 15 (1985 tit Supp. 1987). 
26 The "three-man board" requirement could pose 
constitutional problems under the Maryland 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Md. Const., 
Dec!. Rights art. 46. Acts of the legislature 
almost always satisfy the ERA because ''[u]nless 
the General Assembly specifically provides oth-
erwise in a particular statute, all V10Ttls in this 
Code importing one gender include and apply to 
the otba gender as well." Md. Ann. Code art. I, 
S 7 (1987) (emphasis added). Unlike state sta-
tutes, which are virtually always gender neutral 
as a result of article I, section 7, the State Police 
administrative regulations are more restrictive 
or at least more ambiguous. "Use of the mascu-
line gender herein includes, vJJere applialbk, the 
female gender." Md. State Police Admin. 
Manual ch. 1, S m-2-1 (2d ed. 1977 & Supp. 
1982). 
27 Md. State Police Admin. Manual ch. 5, S V..J-2b. 
21 IJ. (emphasis added). 
29 Southern Maryland Hosp. Centa (1. Fort 
Wasbington Community Hosp., 308 Md. 323, 
332,519 A.2d 727, 731 (1987); Staley (1. Board of 
Educ.,308 Md. 42, 47 n.4, 517 A.2d 349, 351 n.4 
(1986). 
30 Francis f1, DaWdson. .340 F. Supp. 351, 365-66 
(D. Md.), aff'J, 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (citations 
omitted); accord Horizon Mut. SaQ. Bank (1. FeJ-
aal SaQ. &- Loan Ins. Co'IfJ., 674 F.2d 1312, 1315-
,16 (9th Cir. 1982). 
31 347 U.s. 260 (1954). 
32 51 Md. App. 570, 444 A.2d 475 (1982). 
33 IJ. at 573, 444 A.2d at 477; 1« JlrjnCt! Geo~s 
County o. Za~ Corp., 70 Md. App. 392,401, 
521 A.2d 779, 784 (1987); Hopkins (1. Maryland 
Inmate Grietla1lCt! Comm'n, 40 Md. App. 329, 
391 A.2d 1213 (1978) (increased case loads did 
not justify the agency's failure to comply with 
its own "72-hour rule"); 1« a/so Note, VioIa-
tUms by Agmcies of 71mr Own Regulations, 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 629 (1974). 
34 359 U.s. 535 (1959). 
35 IJ. at 540. 
36 E.&, Maryland Port Admin. (1. jolm w: Brtmmer 
Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 60, 492 A.2d 281, 
289 (1985) (state contracting regulation); Dorsey 
o. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 176, 416 A.2d 739, 747 
(1980) (federal uuth-in-lending regulation); 
Messite (1. Colonial Mortgage Sero. Co. Assoc., 287 
Md. 289,293,411 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1980) (VA 
loan orgination fee regulation and agency load 
guaranty directive); see lA Sutherland Statutory 
Construction S 31.06 (Sands 4th ed. 1985) [here-
inafter Sutherland]. 
37 Haroeyo. StAte, 51 Md. App. 113, 116,441 A.2d 
1094, 1097 (1982) (emphasis in original). 
31 Seejolmson (1. StAte, 282 Md. 314, 321, 384 A.2d 
709, 713 (1978); Tranen (1. Aziz, 59 Md. App. 
528, 534, 476 A.2d 1170, 1173 (1984), affJ, 304 
Md. 60S, 500 A.2d 636 (1985). 
39 Office & Professional Emp/qyees Int'l Unum (1. 
Mass Transit Admin., 295 Md. 88, 96, 453 A.2d 
1191, 1195 (1982); 1« Lamb (1. Hammond, 308 
Md. 286,309,518 A.2d 1057,1068 (1987). More-
over, the failure to include a sanction for non-
compliance does not convert a mandatory 
provision into one that is merely directory in 
nature. See Moss o. Director, PatllXent Inst., 279 
Md. 561, 566,369 A.2d lOll, 1013-14 (1977). 
40 See Brig,t (1. Unsatisfied Claim &- judgment Fund 
BJ., 275 Md. 165, 169,338 A.2d 248, 250 (1975). 
41 See ~aD, W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., 
Criminal Law 5 2.2(g) (2d ed. 1986). 
41 Md. State Police Admin. Manual ch. 5, 5 V.J-2h 
(emphasis added). 
43 2A Sutherland, SIIJ1ra note 36, 5 57.11 (emphasis 
added); 11.&, ScanneD (1. City ofSeattk, 97 Wash. 
2d 701, 648 P.2d 435, 438 (1982) (the use of 
"shall" twice and "may" once in two consecu-
tive sentences of the same section resulted in 
"'shall' being consuued as mandatory and 
'may' as permissive"); In re Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 
639 P.2d 98, 101 (1981) (with "shall" used twice 
and "may" used once in two consecutive para-
graphs of the same section, ''[s]uch close prox-
imity of the contrasting verbs 'may' and 'shall' 
require{d] a mandatory effect for the term 
'shall' "); StAte e% rrl Public Disdosme Comm'n 
(1. RAins, 87 Wash. 2d 626,555 P.2d 1368, 1373 
(1976) (when there is one "shall" and one 
"may" in the same sentence, "the intent of [the] 
legislature is demonstrated by no more than the 
language of the sentence itself, [with] a different 
meaning ... intended to attach to each word',). 
.. See 2A Sutherland, SIIprtI note 36, S 47.23; see, 
11.&, Commo~tb e% rei. Hancock (1. Ruck· 
elshaus, 362 F. Supp. 360, 365 (W D. Ky. 1973); 
In reAJoptimJ o/Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 
1976). This is especially uue, when, in the 
natural association of ideas, that which is 
expressed (the "in his discretion" with "may'') 
is so contrasted with that which is omitted (no 
reference to discretion with "shall'') that the 
contrast dictates opposite and contrary treat-
ment. Board of DentAl ETAminers (1. KinI9 369 
So.2d 311,315 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). In Ojfia 
&- Pro/essUmal Emp/cyees Int'! Union (1. Mass 
Transit Admin., 295 Md. 88, 96, 453 A.2d 1191, 
1195 (1982), the Court of Appeals held that 
when an administrator was provided discretion 
to act in only one place, the administrator lack-
ed discretion in all other places. See Jso Burna 
(1. jefferson County Fiscal Court. 239 Ky. 613,40 
S.W. 2d 271, 273 (1931) ("[plowers not confer-
red are just as plainly prohibited as those 
expressly forbidden''). 
45 Md. State Police Admin. Manual ch. 5, S V.J-2b 
(emphasis added). 
46 Although not at issue in the case, there is ambi-
guity in the regulation as to whether "at least" 
modified "one commissioned officer" or "one 
commissioned officer and one member of a 
rank equal to that of the accused." If the 
former, there can be only one member of equal 
rank; if the latter there could be one, two, or 
three members of equal rank. See 2A 
Sutherland, suJ1ra note 36, SS 47.26, .33-.34. 
47 Md. State Police Admin. Manual ch. 5, S V-l-D. 
41 IJ. (emphasis added). 
49 IJ. 
50 IJ. S V-3-2b. 
" Hearing board decisions may be appealed to the 
circuit court and then to the court of special 
appeals. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, S 732. 
52 Record at 1-4 to 1-5. It appears highly unlikely 
that the State Police will consolidate these cases. 
Even though not ordered to do so, the agency 
will probably sever the cases because of the 
combined effect of (1) Judge DeWaters' ruling, 
(2) the LEOBOR and the Maryland State Police 
Administrative Manual, (3) the stated personnel 
policy decision of the State Police, and (4) 
practical considerations. First, Judge DeWaters 
ruled that any board must consist of three 
individuals. Second, both the LEOBOR, Md. 
Ann. Code art. 27, S 727(d)(1), and the 
Maryland State Police Administrative Manual, 
Md. State Police Admin. Manual ch. 5, 5 V -3-2b, 
require "one member of a rank equal to that of 
the accused." In light of the ranks of the defen-
dants, a consolidated board must be composed 
of one captain, one first lieutenant, and one first 
sergeant. Third, the State Police proffered to the 
court that it was the agency's policy never to 
permit a disciplinary hearing in which the guilt 
and punishment of an officer would be decided 
by an officer of lesser rank. A consolidated hear-
ing board would violate this policy with regard 
to two of the three defendants. Fourth, as Judge 
(continued on page 19) 
-------------------------------- JB.J/fhe Law Forum-13 
than having the U.c.c. govern check 
processing and collection by electronic 
fund transfers, perhaps a better alternative 
would be the establishment of such a 
system by contract as designed by the par-
ties. At present, the relationship between 
the bank and its customers under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, superseded in 
pan by application of Regulation J, creates 
unnecessary problems that can be avoided 
by uniform procedures among all parties. 
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